- Eurasia, Russian Politics, Strategy (Military Science), Soviet, post-Soviet, Russian politics, Global Security Issues, Crisis Decision Making and Conflict Resolution, and 11 moreUkrainian Nationalism, Russian Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, Soviet History, Russia, Post-Communist Studies, Russian History, Asian Studies, Russian 'near abroad', Decision Making, and International Securityedit
- Dr. Johanna Granville is a widely traveled scholar of Russian and Eurasian affairs. Email: jgranvi@googlemail.com. Sh... moreDr. Johanna Granville is a widely traveled scholar of Russian and Eurasian affairs. Email: jgranvi@googlemail.com. She is the author of _The First Domino: International Decision Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956_ (Texas A & M University Press, 2004); _If Hope Is Sin, Then We Are All Guilty': Romanian Students' Reactions to the Hungarian Revolution and Soviet Intervention, 1956-1958_ (2008), and numerous refereed publications. Most recently the Panitza Visiting Professor of Communist Studies at the American University in Bulgaria (2014), she previously taught on Fulbright grants at the University of Debrecen in Hungary and the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Granville earned her MALD and Ph.D. in International Relations from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and her BA in Russian Language and Literature from Amherst College.edit
Brief synopsis of the six chapters in Johanna Granville's book, _The First Domino: International Decision making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956_ (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2004).
Research Interests:
Drawing on archival documents, published memoirs, and recent Romanian scholarship, this working paper analyzes and compares the student unrest during and after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Bucharest, Cluj, Iaşi, and Timişoara.
Research Interests: Eastern European Studies, Soviet History, Romanian History, Cold War and Culture, Cold War, and 9 moreCentral European history, Romanian Studies, Hungarian Studies, Cold War International Relations, Cold War history, Central and Eastern Europe, Soviet Foreign policy, 1956 Hungarian revolution Romania, communism riots students a 1956 Hungarian Revolution
This study published in 1998, based on declassified CPSU and Soviet Foreign Ministry archival documents, examines the implementation of the Soviet decision to intervene in Hungary militarily (October-November 1956), and the ensuing period... more
This study published in 1998, based on declassified CPSU and Soviet Foreign Ministry archival documents, examines the implementation of the Soviet decision to intervene in Hungary militarily (October-November 1956), and the ensuing period of "normalization." It shows that the Soviet army did not always perform well during the first intervention (October 24), although its performance improved in the second intervention (November 4). Even the normalization process proceeded more slowly than the West knew, due in part to the persistence of small-scale fighting and the passive resistance of the Hungarian population, disagreement between the Kádár and Khrushchev regimes about the pace and scale of mass arrests and deportations to Soviet Ukraine, and the lack of coordination between the Soviet KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs in carrying out the arrests of Hungarian insurgents.
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Russian documents from communist party archives in Moscow translated by Johanna Granville, printed below, reveal that Hungarian revolutionary leader Imre Nagy, codename “Volodya,” enlisted with the Soviet secret police on September 4,... more
Russian documents from communist party archives in Moscow translated by Johanna Granville, printed below, reveal that Hungarian revolutionary leader Imre Nagy, codename “Volodya,” enlisted with the Soviet secret police on September 4, 1930. At the time it was called the OGPU (Ob''edinennoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie, or Unified State Political Directorate). Having immigrated to Moscow in 1929, Nagy first worked at the Comintern's International Agrarian Institute. He signed in on April 24, 1930, under his new Russian name of "Vladimir Iosifovich (Imre) Nagy. According to the secret police report of March 10, 1938 translated below, Nagy was again recruited three years later, on January 17, 1933, by the OGPU's successor, the NKVD (Narodnyi Komitet Vnutrennikh Del, or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs). According to this document, Nagy was mistakenly arrested March 4, 1938 by an NKVD unit that was unaware of his ties to the organization. Another NKVD captain who knew Nagy's status quickly engineered Nagy's release four days later, on March 8, writing: "'Volodya' … has… provided valuable material about the anti-Soviet activities of a number of people from the ranks of the Hungarian emigration."
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Research Interests: Soviet History, Archives, History of the USSR, History of Hungary, Communication Of Memory In Archives, Libraries And Museums, and 7 moreSoviet Union (History), Suez Crisis, 1956 Hungarian revolution Romania, communism riots students, Nikita Krushchev, Crisis Decision-Making and Conflict Resolution, Communist Party Archives a Soviet Decision Making
This article discusses Romanian President Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (Dej), examining the manner in which he made increased independence from Soviet control possible. Dej, who held leadership positions in Romania, including president, from... more
This article discusses Romanian President Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (Dej), examining the manner in which he made increased independence from Soviet control possible. Dej, who held leadership positions in Romania, including president, from 1944-1965, also established a pattern of foreign policy openness and "liberalness" combined with domestic repression, the author states. Also discussed are the patterns of deception Dej utilized to allow Romania to achieve greater independence from the Soviet Union.
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This article examines how the Hungarian crisis and Soviet interventions strengthened the position of the Romanian communist leadership. First, it eroded the respect of several Bucharest officials for the Soviet army, reinforcing their... more
This article examines how the Hungarian crisis and Soviet interventions strengthened the position of the Romanian communist leadership. First, it eroded the respect of several Bucharest officials for the Soviet army, reinforcing their desire to see Soviet troops leave Romania. Second, the crisis brought back memories of earlier historical events that seemed to provide 'proof' of Hungarian bellicosity, which the Romanian leadership used to discriminate against ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Third, the crisis aroused fears of Transylvanian irredentism, which Bucharest used to control the population. Fourth, by incarcerating Imre Nagy, Bucharest leaders could witness his suffering, which motivated them to avoid his fate.
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This article examines the Hungarian-Yugoslav "normalization" process that took place in the months preceding the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and Josip Broz Tito's ambiguous role in the conflict. Before the 1990s many scholars assumed... more
This article examines the Hungarian-Yugoslav "normalization" process that took place in the months preceding the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and Josip Broz Tito's ambiguous role
in the conflict. Before the 1990s many scholars assumed that once Soviet-Yugoslav relations were "normalized" in the summer of 1955, Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the other
"peoples' democracies" quickly ensued. Newly released documents from five of Moscow's most important archives, including notes of key CPSU Presidium meetings taken by Vladimir Malin, shed valuable light on the behavior and
motives of Soviet, Hungarian, and Yugoslav decision-makers and information providers, and on the events of 1956 generally. The article will explain that the Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement was, in fact, especially slow and tortuous,
particularly between May 1955 and February 1956.'' Having initiated the rift with Yugoslavia in 1948 and enlisted the support of the peoples' democracies in Tito-bashing, the USSR now discovered, ironically, that it could not so easily
induce them (especially Hungary) to make up with Tito after Khrushchev's own trip to Belgrade in May 1955.
in the conflict. Before the 1990s many scholars assumed that once Soviet-Yugoslav relations were "normalized" in the summer of 1955, Yugoslavia's rapprochement with the other
"peoples' democracies" quickly ensued. Newly released documents from five of Moscow's most important archives, including notes of key CPSU Presidium meetings taken by Vladimir Malin, shed valuable light on the behavior and
motives of Soviet, Hungarian, and Yugoslav decision-makers and information providers, and on the events of 1956 generally. The article will explain that the Yugoslav-Hungarian rapprochement was, in fact, especially slow and tortuous,
particularly between May 1955 and February 1956.'' Having initiated the rift with Yugoslavia in 1948 and enlisted the support of the peoples' democracies in Tito-bashing, the USSR now discovered, ironically, that it could not so easily
induce them (especially Hungary) to make up with Tito after Khrushchev's own trip to Belgrade in May 1955.
Research Interests: Eastern European Studies, Cold War, Eastern European history, Yugoslavia, Soviet Union (History), and 5 moreCold War history, Hungarian Revolution of 1956, South Slavic and Balkan political, diplomatic, social and cultural history, Nationalism and identity construction, and Breakup of the former Yugoslavia
Drawing on Romanian archival documents, memoirs and recent scholarship, this article argues that the Hungarian crisis functioned as a godsend for the Romanian leaders by justifying a closing of the ranks, as a course on how to prevent a... more
Drawing on Romanian archival documents, memoirs and recent scholarship, this article argues that the Hungarian crisis functioned as a godsend for the Romanian leaders by justifying a closing of the ranks, as a course on how to prevent a revolution and Soviet invasion, and as a stimulus for coaxing Soviet troops out of Romania. The Dej regime extracted seven lessons from the crisis, namely: avoid isolation from the masses, do not rehabilitate political prisoners, maintain tight control over the press, take military precautions, be tactful to avoid needless alienation of the people, and eschew being perceived as a Soviet puppet.
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This article will provide a more complete account of the impact of Radio Free Europe’s broadcasts on Soviet decision making during the crisis, drawing on documents released from Russian, Hungarian, and U.S. archives in recent years. It... more
This article will provide a more complete account of the impact of Radio Free Europe’s broadcasts on Soviet decision making during the crisis, drawing on documents released from Russian, Hungarian, and U.S. archives in recent years. It will be argued that early balloon and leaflet operations during reformist Imre Nagy’s first term as Hungarian prime minister (1953-1955) - namely “Operation Focus” - both antagonized Nagy and spawned a stern neutralism (later, hostility) toward him among US diplomats and RFE broadcasters during the crisis. This, in turn, caused Soviet leaders to doubt Nagy’s managerial skills, fear the power vacuum in Hungary, and conclude that a second military invasion was necessary. Specifically, one can conclude that RFE’s broadcasting was a key causal factor in the Soviet crackdown for at least three distinct, but interrelated, reasons: 1) the broadcasts contributed to Moscow’s lack of faith in Nagy’s ability to control the situation; 2) they aroused Soviet fears of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact long before Nagy himself announced it; and 3) the broadcasts contributed to the disbandment of the Hungarian security police (ÁVH), thus convincing Soviet (and Hungarian) communist leaders that Soviet troops were needed to fill the security vacuum in Hungary.
Research Interests: Soviet History, Cold War and Culture, Public Diplomacy, Cold War, American Foreign Policy, and 12 morePsychological operations (PSYOP), Cold War International Relations, International Radio Broadcasting, Disinformation, Containment, Broadcasting Filming/Radio and TV Production, Psychological warfare, Radio Free Europe, Radio Broadcasting, Psyops, Eisenhower, and Kremlin
Magyar forditás: Johanna Granville, "Forewarned is Forearmed: How the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 Helped the Romanian Leadership. _Europe-Asia_ (2010), vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 615-645. Magyar forditó: Dr. Pál Lieli. This article examines how the... more
Magyar forditás: Johanna Granville, "Forewarned is Forearmed: How the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 Helped the Romanian Leadership. _Europe-Asia_ (2010), vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 615-645. Magyar forditó: Dr. Pál Lieli.
This article examines how the Hungarian crisis and Soviet interventions strengthened the position of the Romanian communist leadership. First, it eroded the respect of several Bucharest officials for the Soviet army, reinforcing their desire to see Soviet troops leave Romania. Second, the crisis brought back memories of earlier historical events that seemed to provide ‘proof’ of Hungarian bellicosity, which the Romanian leadership used to discriminate against ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Third, the crisis aroused fears of Transylvanian irredentism, which Bucharest used to control the population. Fourth, by incarcerating Imre Nagy, Bucharest leaders could witness his suffering, which motivated them to avoid his fate.
This article examines how the Hungarian crisis and Soviet interventions strengthened the position of the Romanian communist leadership. First, it eroded the respect of several Bucharest officials for the Soviet army, reinforcing their desire to see Soviet troops leave Romania. Second, the crisis brought back memories of earlier historical events that seemed to provide ‘proof’ of Hungarian bellicosity, which the Romanian leadership used to discriminate against ethnic Hungarians in Romania. Third, the crisis aroused fears of Transylvanian irredentism, which Bucharest used to control the population. Fourth, by incarcerating Imre Nagy, Bucharest leaders could witness his suffering, which motivated them to avoid his fate.
Research Interests:
Magyar forditás: "Hungary, 101: Seven Ways to Avoid a Revolution and Soviet Invasion of Romania," _Cold War History_10(1): 81-106. "Drawing on Romanian archival documents, memoirs and recent scholarship, this article argues that the... more
Magyar forditás: "Hungary, 101: Seven Ways to Avoid a Revolution and Soviet Invasion of Romania," _Cold War History_10(1): 81-106.
"Drawing on Romanian archival documents, memoirs and recent scholarship, this article argues that the Hungarian crisis functioned as a godsend for the Romanian leaders by justifying a closing of the ranks, as a course on how to prevent a revolution and Soviet invasion, and as a stimulus for coaxing Soviet troops out of Romania. The Dej regime extracted seven lessons from the crisis, namely: avoid isolation from the masses, do not rehabilitate political prisoners, maintain tight control over the press, take military precautions, be tactful to avoid needless alienation of the people, and eschew being perceived as a Soviet puppet.
"Drawing on Romanian archival documents, memoirs and recent scholarship, this article argues that the Hungarian crisis functioned as a godsend for the Romanian leaders by justifying a closing of the ranks, as a course on how to prevent a revolution and Soviet invasion, and as a stimulus for coaxing Soviet troops out of Romania. The Dej regime extracted seven lessons from the crisis, namely: avoid isolation from the masses, do not rehabilitate political prisoners, maintain tight control over the press, take military precautions, be tactful to avoid needless alienation of the people, and eschew being perceived as a Soviet puppet.
Research Interests:
This essay will compare the events of 1956, drawing on recently declassified materials from Hungarian, Polish and Russian archives.While the recently accessible archival sources do not call for a radically new interpretation of events,... more
This essay will compare the events of 1956, drawing on recently declassified materials from Hungarian, Polish and Russian archives.While the recently accessible archival sources do not call for a radically new interpretation of events, they do yield important insights and heighten the relevance of multicausal explanations of Soviet interventionism: the particular interplay of leading communist personalities, the mood of the masses and the overall sequence of events themselves. Nagy may not have been as ‘innocent’ and progressive, given his initial opposition to the very decisions for which he has gone down in history as having made. Moreover, the Poznań revolt probably had greater impact on Polish decision-makers than originally thought. Finally, while Alfred Thayer Mahan may have been correct in stating that force is more operative when it is known to exist but is not brandished, Gomułka’s bold stance on 19 October 1956 seems not to have impressed the Kremlin bosses to the extent hitherto believed. Thus, Gomułka was arguably less successful in deterring the Soviet leaders during their brief sojourn in Warsaw and less secure politically in his own country than historians have generally surmised.
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Soon after Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev exposed Joseph Stalin's crimes in February 1956, several Stalinist dictators in Eastern Europe similar in outlook to Romanian general secretary Gheorghiu-Dej were discredited and toppled... more
Soon after Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev exposed Joseph Stalin's crimes in February 1956, several Stalinist dictators in Eastern Europe similar in outlook to Romanian general secretary Gheorghiu-Dej were discredited and toppled by rivals: Hungary (Mátyás Rákosi), Poland (Edward Ochab), and Bulgaria (Vulko Velev Chervenkov), as were Stalinist leaders in western communist parties, such as in Greece (Nikolaos Zachariadis). Gheorghiu-Dej, however, managed to keep his post until his death of lung cancer in 1965. Romania, the only country other than Albania to maintain a tight clamp over its citizens, also became the only Warsaw Pact country from which both Soviet troops (1958) and KGB advisors (1964) were actually withdrawn during the Cold War. This article will show that that Gheorghiu-Dej, too, faced a threat to his power in 1956. Two Politburo members, Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chişinevschi, had risked criticizing the Romanian leader, to some extent at the March Plenum, but mostly at the Politburo meetings of April 3, 4, 6 and 12, 1956. Drawing on the minutes of these meetings, never before published in English translation, as well as on other Romanian archival documents and recent scholarship, this article will argue that the factional challenge of Dej failed primarily because of four factors that both discredited the oppositionists and mobilized the Bucharest leaders - especially the disgraced politicians - to act in concert to contain the spread of the Hungarian revolution into Romania. These are: the oppositionists' lack of support from Moscow; the lack of living martyrs and recognition of mutual guilt for spreading the personality cult; collective memories of their underground days with the concomitant fear of factionalism; and aversion to “petty bourgeois intellectualism.”
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Russia watchers in the West expected the Russian economy to prosper, as did the Chinese economy, once Boris Yeltsin, the first freely elected Russian president, cast off the communist mantle in 1991. Instead, he fostered the growth of... more
Russia watchers in the West expected the Russian economy to prosper, as did the Chinese economy, once Boris Yeltsin, the first freely elected Russian president, cast off the communist mantle in 1991. Instead, he fostered the growth of crony capitalism, deliberately enriching a handful of men in return for their political support. Since Yeltsin's resignation in 1999, journalists and scholars have begun to analyze his regime more frankly. Although Gorbachev established in Russia the principles of free speech and democratic accountability, Yeltsin failed to expand the aims of glasnost and perestroika. The "democrats," led by Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais, freed prices in 1992 and unleashed hyperinflation before they privatized Russia's assets. Most Russian citizens lost their savings in only a few weeks. While the few billionaire "oligarchs" liken themselves to the American "robber barons" of the nineteenth century, no real comparison can be drawn. Those well-connected young men made fortunes not by creating new enterprises that increased their country's wealth, as did Carnegie (steel), Rockefeller (oil), Ford (automobiles), and Morgan (finance). Instead, they played the role of old state trading monopolies, arbitraging the huge difference between old domestic prices for Russian commodities and the prices prevailing on the world market. Instead of investing in the Russian economy, they stashed billions of dollars in Swiss bank accounts. Experts estimate that as much as $15 billion leaves Russia each year as either "capital flight" or laundered money from illegal transactions.
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On April 30, 1998 the United States Senate ratified the Clinton Administration's decision to enlarge NATO by a vote of 80 to 19. This article analyzes the pros and cons of NATO expansion.
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During the heated debate leading up to the Senate's ratification of the Clinton administration's decision to enlarge NATO, opponents predicted that expansion would alienate Russia, with dire consequences for world peace. Nevertheless, by... more
During the heated debate leading up to the Senate's ratification of the Clinton
administration's decision to enlarge NATO, opponents predicted that expansion would alienate Russia, with dire consequences for world peace. Nevertheless, by a vote of 80 to 19, the Senate endorsed the policy on 30 April 1998. One by one, over the ensuing months, parliaments in other NATO member countries ratified the expansion decision as well. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became the newest members of NATO in a ceremony held in Independence, Missouri, on 12 March 1999. The crisis in Kosovo that occasioned NATO military action against the Russian-favored Yugoslavian government and its president, Slobodan Milosevic, has ended. However, the issues of NATO expansion and Kosovo will no doubt figure prominently in the Russian presidential election in June 2000. The time is right to take stock and ask: Have recent NATO decisions discredited the liberal Rus-
sian political parties and strengthened the conservative ultranationalist and Com-
munist parties? In this article I will provide a framework for assessing the impact of the NATO expansion policy on internal Russian politics and public opinion after 1999, using the positions and motivations of the Russian political parties. After a brief discussion of the Boris Yeltsin administration's viewpoint, I will summarize the views of each of the other key parties across the political spectrum at that time and will show that, while most Russian political parties opposed the expansion policy, they did so for different reasons.
administration's decision to enlarge NATO, opponents predicted that expansion would alienate Russia, with dire consequences for world peace. Nevertheless, by a vote of 80 to 19, the Senate endorsed the policy on 30 April 1998. One by one, over the ensuing months, parliaments in other NATO member countries ratified the expansion decision as well. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became the newest members of NATO in a ceremony held in Independence, Missouri, on 12 March 1999. The crisis in Kosovo that occasioned NATO military action against the Russian-favored Yugoslavian government and its president, Slobodan Milosevic, has ended. However, the issues of NATO expansion and Kosovo will no doubt figure prominently in the Russian presidential election in June 2000. The time is right to take stock and ask: Have recent NATO decisions discredited the liberal Rus-
sian political parties and strengthened the conservative ultranationalist and Com-
munist parties? In this article I will provide a framework for assessing the impact of the NATO expansion policy on internal Russian politics and public opinion after 1999, using the positions and motivations of the Russian political parties. After a brief discussion of the Boris Yeltsin administration's viewpoint, I will summarize the views of each of the other key parties across the political spectrum at that time and will show that, while most Russian political parties opposed the expansion policy, they did so for different reasons.
Research Interests:
" Abstract: Transatlantic and nationalist tensions have ballooned since the inception of the credit crunch. People are asking: Where did the global debt crisis originate, in Europe or North... more
" Abstract:
Transatlantic and nationalist tensions have ballooned since the inception of the credit crunch. People are asking: Where did the global debt crisis originate, in Europe or North America? What are the long and short-term causes? This article will pinpoint at least nine long-term and short-term causes of the crisis, drawing on two recently published books by David and Lyric Hale, and John Mauldin and Jonathan Tepper. These causes include: the initial departure from the Bretton Woods era gold standard in 1971, the deregulation of both the U.S. and European banking systems in the 1980s and 1990s, the securitization of sub-prime mortgages, Goldman Sachs’ cross-currency swaps to hide Greek debt, the excessive levels of Greek debt, the structural flaws of the EMU, Germany’s insistence on low interest rates, Germany and France’s violation of the budget limits in 2003, and the cognitive biases of financiers and legislators on both sides of the Atlantic. Until governments stop issuing blank checks to the “too large to fail” banks and establish a sturdy system of checks and balances, a second and more destructive financial tsunami will engulf the world.
"
Transatlantic and nationalist tensions have ballooned since the inception of the credit crunch. People are asking: Where did the global debt crisis originate, in Europe or North America? What are the long and short-term causes? This article will pinpoint at least nine long-term and short-term causes of the crisis, drawing on two recently published books by David and Lyric Hale, and John Mauldin and Jonathan Tepper. These causes include: the initial departure from the Bretton Woods era gold standard in 1971, the deregulation of both the U.S. and European banking systems in the 1980s and 1990s, the securitization of sub-prime mortgages, Goldman Sachs’ cross-currency swaps to hide Greek debt, the excessive levels of Greek debt, the structural flaws of the EMU, Germany’s insistence on low interest rates, Germany and France’s violation of the budget limits in 2003, and the cognitive biases of financiers and legislators on both sides of the Atlantic. Until governments stop issuing blank checks to the “too large to fail” banks and establish a sturdy system of checks and balances, a second and more destructive financial tsunami will engulf the world.
"
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As of September 2012, the total U.S. public debt was $16 trillion, or 103% of gross domestic product. Interest payments alone amounted to $340 billion at an interest rate of 2.13%. This article will examine five recently published books... more
As of September 2012, the total U.S. public debt was $16 trillion, or 103% of gross domestic product. Interest payments alone amounted to $340 billion at an interest rate of 2.13%. This article will examine five recently published books in order to answer several questions. How serious is the global economic crisis? Why does debt matter? What caused the 2008 recession? What have been the effects of economic globalization? Is the United States in absolute decline? How should the country deal with a rising China?
Research Interests: Monetary Economics, Globalization, Chinese Studies, Sovereignty, European Security and Defence Policy, and 15 moreDeflationism, China, Financial Markets, Fiscal Policy and debt Management, Emerging Markets, Sovereign Debt, Financial Derivatives, Recession, Investing, Precious Metals, Sovereign debt crisis in the EU, Liquidity Risk Management, Quantitative Easing, Commodity trade, and European Debt Crisis
Regardless of the invading state's aims, ideology, firepower, or population-centric "hearts and minds" strategies, counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan always seem doomed to fail. The British (1839-1842, 1878-1880), Soviets (1979-1989)... more
Regardless of the invading state's aims, ideology, firepower, or population-centric "hearts and minds" strategies, counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan always seem doomed to fail. The British (1839-1842, 1878-1880), Soviets (1979-1989) and Americans (2001-2013) have all underestimated the difficulties of waging war in this fiercely independent country. The plethora of books published on Afghanistan describing these difficulties fall roughly into four categories: archive-based historical studies, soldiers' war diaries, strategic analyses, and policymakers' memoirs. This article will assess three recently published books by an academic (Artemy Kalinovsky), a US government official (Dov Zakheim), and a US Marine combat veteran (Francis J. West), respectively.
Research Interests: Terrorism, War Studies, Afghanistan, Political Violence and Terrorism, Nationalism, and 10 moreCentral Asian Studies, Insurgency/Counterinsurgency(COIN), Nationalism And State Building, Central Asia, Ethnic Conflict and Civil War, U.S. Foreign Policy, Counterinsurgency, Regime change, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Military Intervention
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Page 1. SEER, Vol. 8o, No. 4, October 2002 1956 Reconsidered: Why Hungary and Not Poland? JOHANNA GRANVILLE As the French moralist FranSois de la Rochefoucauld (I 613-I 68o) wrote, 'although men flatter themselves ...
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Review Essay: “Mission Unaccomplished: Taking Stock of the U.S. and Soviet Wars in Afghanistan”A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. By Kalinovsky Artemy M.. (Harvard University Press, 2011.)The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan. By West Francis J.. (Rand...more
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An estimated 35,000 Thai girls are currently held in debt bondage, and tens of thousands of other women from countries such as the Philippines, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ghana, Nigeria, and most recently, the Soviet successor states... more
An estimated 35,000 Thai girls are currently held in debt bondage, and tens of thousands of other women from countries such as the Philippines, Dominican Republic, Colombia, Ghana, Nigeria, and most recently, the Soviet successor states are trafficked abroad and forced into prostitution to pay off their debts for transportation and housing. The United Nations estimates that as many as four million people are trafficked throughout the world each year, resulting in illicit profits amounting to seven billion dollars annually.
Given the extent and duration of the problem of global human trafficking, and more specifically, forced and voluntary prostitution, astonishingly few people fully understand it. In Article 3 of the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons” that supplements the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime, human trafficking is defined as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Forms of exploitation include: prostitution, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude, or the removal of bodily organs. This article reviews five books on human trafficking that go a long way to inform readers of the causes and consequences of this global phenomenon, and what attempts have been made to curtail it.
Given the extent and duration of the problem of global human trafficking, and more specifically, forced and voluntary prostitution, astonishingly few people fully understand it. In Article 3 of the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons” that supplements the United Nations Convention against transnational organized crime, human trafficking is defined as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Forms of exploitation include: prostitution, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude, or the removal of bodily organs. This article reviews five books on human trafficking that go a long way to inform readers of the causes and consequences of this global phenomenon, and what attempts have been made to curtail it.
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Review by Johanna Granville of Karl P. Benziger, Imre Nagy. Martyr of the Nation: Contested History, Legitimacy, and Popular Memory in Hungary (New York, Lexington Books, 2008), published in Canadian Journal of History, vol. 47, no. 3... more
Review by Johanna Granville of Karl P. Benziger, Imre Nagy. Martyr of the Nation: Contested History, Legitimacy, and Popular Memory in Hungary (New York, Lexington Books, 2008), published in Canadian Journal of History, vol. 47, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 675-6.
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This is a review of Artemy M. Kalinovsky's _The Long Good-bye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan_ Humanities Directory,
Vol. 1, No. 1, 23-26, August 2013.
Vol. 1, No. 1, 23-26, August 2013.
What is new about the WikiLeaks phenomenon and why is it important? Is WikiLeaks a form of journalism? What were the effects of WikiLeaks’ revelations? How has WikiLeaks impacted the future of the internet? Charlie Beckett and James Ball... more
What is new about the WikiLeaks phenomenon and why is it important? Is WikiLeaks a form of journalism? What were the effects of WikiLeaks’ revelations? How has WikiLeaks impacted the future of the internet? Charlie Beckett and James Ball pose these and other questions in their new book.
WikiLeaks: News in the Networked Era (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012). WikiLeaks was managed by a small team of pro-transparency hackers, including the Australian Julian Assange and a few German members of the so-called Chaos Computer Club (18). As Beckett and Ball point out, WikiLeaks founders pioneered in the development of information security, setting up hidden open-source encryption standards. “These enable WikiLeaks and its sources to hold and disseminate information unreadable by anyone else in the world, including security services” (20). In chapter two, the authors describe three of WikiLeaks’ biggest “scoops” in 2010: the Afghan war logs (including the “Collateral Murder” video), the Iraq war logs, and the American Embassy cable releases. In chapter three Beckett and Ball point out that WikiLeaks’ disclosures – in jeopardizing lives and endangering sensitive diplomatic operations – might “create a freedom-of-expression backlash,” thus helping pro-government, security-minded individuals who advocate limiting the openness of the internet. This book by Beckett and Ball – one of the first to analyze WikiLeaks with respect to the evolution of contemporary journalism – would be an excellent text to assign in courses on journalism.
WikiLeaks: News in the Networked Era (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012). WikiLeaks was managed by a small team of pro-transparency hackers, including the Australian Julian Assange and a few German members of the so-called Chaos Computer Club (18). As Beckett and Ball point out, WikiLeaks founders pioneered in the development of information security, setting up hidden open-source encryption standards. “These enable WikiLeaks and its sources to hold and disseminate information unreadable by anyone else in the world, including security services” (20). In chapter two, the authors describe three of WikiLeaks’ biggest “scoops” in 2010: the Afghan war logs (including the “Collateral Murder” video), the Iraq war logs, and the American Embassy cable releases. In chapter three Beckett and Ball point out that WikiLeaks’ disclosures – in jeopardizing lives and endangering sensitive diplomatic operations – might “create a freedom-of-expression backlash,” thus helping pro-government, security-minded individuals who advocate limiting the openness of the internet. This book by Beckett and Ball – one of the first to analyze WikiLeaks with respect to the evolution of contemporary journalism – would be an excellent text to assign in courses on journalism.
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review of A. Ross Johnson and Eugene R. Parta, Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Budapest, 2010), published in The New Hungarian Quarterly (2013), vol. 53, number 205-206, pp. 199-204.
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Review of Roger Gough's book, _A Good Comrade: János Kádár, Communism and Hungary_ American Historical Review_ (2007),112(4): 1280.
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Research Interests: Ancient History, Archaeology, Middle East Studies, Africa, Egypt, and 11 moreGraeco-Roman Egypt, Middle East Politics, Modern Egypt, Development in the Middle East and North Africa, Sudanese Archaeology, Sudan, Ancient Egyptian History, Ancient Egyptian Art and Archaeology, Middle East, Ancient Egypt a Nubians
There is no comprehensive definition of a civil war that all scholars agree upon. The simplest definition is that of a violent conflict in which organized groups within a country fight against each other for political control (of the... more
There is no comprehensive definition of a civil war that all scholars agree upon. The simplest definition is that of a violent conflict in which organized groups within a country fight against each other for political control (of the center, a region, or over a separatist state) or to change government policies. According to the fuller definition developed largely by J. David Singer and Melvin Small, a civil war is an armed conflict that has: (1) challenged the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state; (2) occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; (3) involved the state as one of the principal combatants; (4) included rebels with the ability to mount an organized opposition; (5) involved parties concerned with the prospect of living together in the same political unit after the end of the war; and (6) caused more than one thousand deaths.
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Short review detailing how Polish citizens at the grassroots level experienced the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland (now western Ukraine) and the mechanisms Soviet authorities used to induce their participation.
Research Interests: Military History, Soviet History, Border Studies, Belarusian Studies, Polish History, and 16 moreGenocide Studies, Transnational History, Second World War, Migration Studies, Anti-Semitism, Transnational migration, Poland, Ukraine, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Deportation, Russian / Soviet military and diplomatic history, Red Army Faction, Soviet occupation, Soviet Foreign policy, Ukraine in WWII, and Istoriya Belarussii
Research Interests: Russian Studies, Russian Foreign Policy, Transnational History, Ukraine (History), Crimean Tatar, and 13 morePolitics of Ukraine, Ukraine, EU institutions, EU foreign policy, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, securitization, Holodomor, Crimea, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, Vladimir Putin, Crimean Tatars, Kievan Rus', Ukrainian Nationalism, Nationalism, History of Ukraine, Transcarpathia, Old Ruthenian Culture a Holocaust and Holodomor in Ukraine
... Agriculture 333 Geliy Shmeliov, Bruce McWilliams, John Giraldez, and Alexander Vedrashko 22. The Coal Industry 353 Alexander Arbatov and Edit Kranner 23. ... We also thank Igor Kondrashin for serving as interpreter and translator.... more
... Agriculture 333 Geliy Shmeliov, Bruce McWilliams, John Giraldez, and Alexander Vedrashko 22. The Coal Industry 353 Alexander Arbatov and Edit Kranner 23. ... We also thank Igor Kondrashin for serving as interpreter and translator. Page 12. Page 13. ...
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In The History of Ukraine, Paul Kubicek takes on the daunting task of covering roughly thirteen centuries of Ukrainian history in just 180 pages. The book contains ten concise chapters, as well as a chronology, bibliographical essay, and... more
In The History of Ukraine, Paul Kubicek takes on the daunting task of covering roughly thirteen centuries of Ukrainian history in just 180 pages. The book contains ten concise chapters, as well as a chronology, bibliographical essay, and biographical sketches of key leaders. Chapters One and Two describe Kievan Rus' and the Polish-Lithuanian period respectively. Chapters Four and Five discuss Ukraine under the Russian Empire and Western Ukraine under the Habsburg Empire. The next three chapters trace the rise of Ukrainian nationalism after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, industrial transformation during the Soviet period, and the drive for Ukrainian independence spawned by Mikhail Gorbachev's reform programme in the late 1980s. The final two chapters outline the political and economic struggles in post-Soviet Ukraine under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma (1991-2004) and the Orange Revolution led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko.
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... the Jewish Mu-seum. Frankfurt; and Michael Brenner. Munich University, for help-ing me to understand the variety of Jewish views on German reuni-fication and its relation to the Nazi past; to Director Karl Ulrich Mayer, Martin... more
... the Jewish Mu-seum. Frankfurt; and Michael Brenner. Munich University, for help-ing me to understand the variety of Jewish views on German reuni-fication and its relation to the Nazi past; to Director Karl Ulrich Mayer, Martin Diewald, and Heike Solga. ...
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Source: Johanna Granville, review of David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956, in International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4 (July 2003), pp. 879–936.... more
Source: Johanna Granville, review of David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956, in International Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4 (July 2003), pp. 879–936.
David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956. By. Harvard University Press. 2002. xv + 378 pp. $49.95.
David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956. By. Harvard University Press. 2002. xv + 378 pp. $49.95.
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Research Interests:
review of Robert I. Friedman, Red Mafiya : How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America (Little Brown & Company, May 2000) in Canadian Slavonic Papers (March-June 2002), vol. 44, nos. ½, pp. 137-38
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Executive Summary: In the weeks following the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, both the United States and European Union have issued a range of sanctions to punish the Putin administration. But a belligerent response aimed at... more
Executive Summary: In the weeks following the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, both the United States and European Union have issued a range of sanctions to punish the Putin administration. But a belligerent response aimed at “punishing Putin,” even if confined to economic measures, will probably just escalate the crisis. Such actions increase ill will, freeze vital channels of communication, and damage the U.S. and EU economies.
Military measures, such as deploying NATO, especially U.S., ground troops on Russia’s borders, staging military exercises, and sending military aid to the unelected interim government in Kiev are even more counterproductive and dangerous. The Crimean annexation should be a wake-up call on another level. If the United States and NATO violate international law as they have in the Balkans, Iraq, and other locales, other states will feel entitled to do so as well.
The most important goal should be to prevent current East-West tensions from getting any worse. An especially crucial step is to help preserve Ukraine’s unity and prevent the outbreak of a civil war. That requires a decent working relationship with Moscow. There is an even worse scenario than growing disorder in Ukraine, however. The prospect of a full blown new cold war, and perhaps even an armed clash, with Russia is all too real, if the United States and the European Union powers do not adopt more sober, realistic policies soon.
Military measures, such as deploying NATO, especially U.S., ground troops on Russia’s borders, staging military exercises, and sending military aid to the unelected interim government in Kiev are even more counterproductive and dangerous. The Crimean annexation should be a wake-up call on another level. If the United States and NATO violate international law as they have in the Balkans, Iraq, and other locales, other states will feel entitled to do so as well.
The most important goal should be to prevent current East-West tensions from getting any worse. An especially crucial step is to help preserve Ukraine’s unity and prevent the outbreak of a civil war. That requires a decent working relationship with Moscow. There is an even worse scenario than growing disorder in Ukraine, however. The prospect of a full blown new cold war, and perhaps even an armed clash, with Russia is all too real, if the United States and the European Union powers do not adopt more sober, realistic policies soon.